

# FOREIGN POLICY

## BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events

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## Will Korea Cease-Fire Talks Bring Peace or War?

Since June 23, when Russia's UN delegate, Jacob A. Malik, declared that cease-fire negotiations in Korea were within the realm of possibility, propaganda exchanges between the U.S.S.R. and the United States have developed into a complex point-counterpoint. President Truman on July 7 conveyed to President Nikolai M. Shvernik of the U.S.S.R. a congressional resolution voicing friendship for the Russian people and suggested that his message be made public by the Kremlin. This the Soviet government has so far failed to do. Instead, on July 14 it launched an English-language biweekly magazine, *The News*, containing articles by Russian historians and diplomats who assert that friendship between Russians and Americans is both desirable and practicable, and some of these articles have been reprinted in the Russian press. Meanwhile, however, other Soviet publications have kept up attacks on the "warmongering" of the United States and the "imperialism" of the Western powers.

In similar vein Soviet Deputy Premier Vyacheslav Molotov at a Polish anniversary celebration in Warsaw on July 22 denounced the Western powers, accusing them of "open preparation for a third world war" and of "acts of direct aggression." He also spoke in violent terms of Marshal Tito's regime in Yugoslavia as a "hired gang of criminals who . . . transformed Yugoslavia into a weapon of the aggressive imperialist powers." By contrast, in Moscow on July 27 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob A. Malik, in a statement to a delegation of British Quakers visiting Russia, declared that Russia is ready "to enter negotiations . . . with the view to agreement" with the Western powers and that Moscow has no intention

of "exporting revolution." He quoted Premier Stalin's remark to Roy S. Howard, president of the Scripps-Howard papers, in 1936 that "to assert that we are allegedly desirous of making revolution in other countries, interfering in their lives, is to express what does not exist in reality and what we have never professed."

### New Thrust Expected?

Official United States reactions to these sharply contrasting expressions of views from Moscow has ranged all the way from optimism about the prospects for reasonable cease-fire terms at Kaesong to dark forebodings about the ultimate purposes of the Kremlin and vigorous warnings against complacency in this country. Speaking on July 24 at the 250th anniversary of the founding of Detroit, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that the nation should not be misled by the "switching on of a Russian lullaby" into relaxation of its defense program. "We are in great danger, greater perhaps than many Americans now appreciate," he said, adding that whether there was peace in Korea, "whether our adversaries are cooing like doves or growling like bears," the task of the United States would remain unchanged. Secretary of Defense Marshall stated he felt "shock" and "humiliation" at the evidence of a "letdown" in the United States following Mr. Malik's June 23 statement on a Korean cease-fire. And President Truman, in an address in Detroit on July 28, voiced deep apprehension when he said: "We do not yet know whether the Communists really desire peace in Korea, or whether they are simply trying to gain by negotiations what they have not been able to gain by conquest." He also charged that the Soviet

leaders were "putting themselves in a position where they can commit new acts of aggression at any time."

The President's blunt remarks brought out into the open the anxiety increasingly expressed in Washington that the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists, in case of a break-down of the cease-fire negotiations, would now, because of the recent build-up of their forces, be in a better position than before June 23 to launch an attack on the UN forces. Alternatively, assuming that a cease-fire is achieved—and some observers reporting from Tokyo believe that the Communists genuinely want to end the war—Washington fears that Russia, having focused our attention on Korea, might suddenly make a thrust elsewhere; most probably at Yugoslavia. Mr. Molotov's sharp words about Marshal Tito seemed to confirm this fear. And on July 28 the Moscow trade union publication, *Trud*, ominously compared Yugoslavia with South Korea and predicted the Balkan country would attack its neighbors.

The Yugoslavs, however, while fully aware of the danger that their country might be invaded by the considerably increased armed forces of its neighbors—Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania—do not believe that war is in prospect. The Soviet government, they contend, has been given a graphic demonstration in Korea of what collective action against aggression can accomplish and must be aware that the Western world will react even more vigorously to a threat in Europe than it did in Asia. In their opinion Mr. Molotov, who actually was less harsh toward Yugoslavia on this occasion than Soviet leaders have been in the past, was warning not Marshal Tito but Poles who might hope to follow

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the example of the Yugoslavs. Read in this context, Mr. Molotov's speech might be interpreted as a sign of the difficulties the U.S.S.R. is experiencing in maintaining its influence over Eastern Europe and would corroborate rather than contradict the desire for a Korean cease-fire shown by Moscow and Peiping. This interpretation is supported by the announcement on July 30 that nine senior officers of the Polish Army, including four generals, would be placed on trial on July 31 on charges of sabotage and espionage on behalf of Britain and the United States.

### *Aims of Kremlin*

If war is not the immediate prospect, what are the objectives of the Kremlin and how does it expect to achieve them? Some of these objectives have already emerged from the stillborn Paris conference of the Big Four deputy foreign ministers. The Soviet government wants a five-power conference which would include Communist China to discuss outstanding issues in both Europe and Asia. It wants to see the end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It wants to prevent the rearment of Western Germany and, as indicated in exchanges of views about the Japanese peace treaty, also of Japan. It also obviously hopes that the expectation of a prolonged truce, if not of an over-all settlement, will slow down the military preparedness tempo in the United States and especially in Western Europe. It must be counting, too, on the possibility that once the war in Korea has ended, the political problems of a peace settlement in the Far East will again reveal differences of opinion between the United

States and other UN members, notably Britain, about the seating of Peiping in the UN and the future status of Formosa.

The United States faces a dilemma. It has repeatedly stated its unwavering desire for peace and is not in a position to reject without scrutiny peace proposals which might emanate from Moscow—for such a rejection would only serve the Kremlin's propaganda. At the same time Washington has no faith in any statements made by Soviet leaders—perhaps less faith in conciliatory than in warlike statements. American officials have declared that deeds, not words, are necessary to prove Moscow's good faith. What deeds would seem both convincing and valuable to this country?

Some discussions of Soviet policy have created the impression that only if Russia would withdraw into its 1939 boundaries—it is not always clear whether before or after the Nazi-Soviet pact which gave Russia eastern Poland—will the West be satisfied as to its intentions. Even if such a withdrawal could be realistically anticipated, would it necessarily redound to the benefit of the United States at the present time? Once the Russians had returned to their own territory, would not a comparable withdrawal be expected of the United States from West Germany and Japan? Might not questions then be asked about the North Atlantic pact and the network of bases we have built or are planning to build in Europe, Japan, North Africa? Some Eastern European experts, who do not believe it is realistic to expect immediate Russian withdrawal, have suggested as maximum terms to be asked of the Kremlin conclusion of a peace treaty

with Austria, cessation of the armament build-up in the Balkan countries, and admission to the United Nations of all countries now seeking membership. Acceptance of these terms, they contend, would give evidence of a genuine desire on the part of the Kremlin to ease existing tension without imposing on it conditions which a great power would find it difficult to fulfill.

Secretary of State Acheson, however, went much further than the withdrawal of Russia from Eastern Europe when, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 26, he said that the policy of encroachment and consolidation pursued by Russia over the last 500 years "has got to be stopped." This statement has been interpreted by Alexander Kerensky and other anti-Communist Russians here as a threat to dismember Russia which gives the appearance of confirming Soviet propaganda assertions that the United States is determined not merely to check Russian aggression but also to destroy the Russian state. Nor is it possible to foresee the transformation in the world balance of power that might come about if a historical rollback of 500 years were applied to all nations.

Thus, if no new military thrusts should take place, American diplomats will face the double task of defining the terms which we believe it is in our interest and in the interest of our allies to demand of Moscow in case new negotiations are undertaken, as well as our own maximum objectives with respect to Russia as a national state and communism as one of its weapons.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## *Executive Strives to Rouse Congress on Foreign Aid*

WASHINGTON—Not since the drive to gain approval for the Marshall plan almost four years ago has the Administration waged such an intensive campaign through speeches and statements for a foreign policy objective as in its present campaign to persuade Congress to increase American military strength and accept the \$8.6 billion foreign military and economic aid program which Mr. Truman has recommended. The two main points which officials stress in their public pronouncements are that the Soviet Union will probably "commit new acts of aggression at any time," despite the truce talks in Korea, and that the U.S.S.R. and its allies are massing troops.

The Administration's efforts, however, have left Congress calm. While it declares that the Russian menace is growing, American officials in West Germany re-

port that the United States is developing military power faster than the Soviet bloc. General Marshall and President Truman both have emphasized military activity in the pro-Soviet nations bordering Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslavs manifest a greater sense of confidence in their future security than they have shown since the break with Moscow in 1948. Many Congressmen ask themselves whether the Administration is conjuring up dangers in order to win appropriations from the Capitol. Congress may eventually give Mr. Truman all he wants, but it is not yet ready to do so.

For the fiscal year that began on July 1 the President is asking Congress to appropriate \$61 billion for the military establishment. This would provide an armed force of about 3.5 million men and women (the ceiling set by Congress is 4 million).

Beyond that, the Defense Department has requested and the House Armed Services Committee has recommended an additional expenditure of \$5,768,720,000 for the construction of military bases in the United States and abroad. In his message conveying the midyear economic report to Congress President Truman on July 23 said that an increase in military strength beyond previous recommendations might become necessary. On the following day the Department of Defense reported that studies of possible need for greater strength has begun. Indicative of one use to which the increased strength might be put, Secretary Marshall on July 27 told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the country should soon assign 400,000 troops to Europe. This figure is double the previous official estimate. The troops

for-Europe resolution which the Senate adopted last winter at the conclusion of the so-called "great debate" expressed the Senators' willingness that the Administration assign six divisions to Europe. The six divisions were understood to mean 200,000 men; now General Marshall has stated that 400,000 men would mean no more than six divisions. This appears to be a change in the structure of the American division and has revived the troops-for-Europe discussion in Congress.

As for military strength abroad, the Administration is pressing for approval of the foreign aid program, which would provide not only \$6.3 billion in military aid but also \$2.3 billion in economic aid. Today, United States foreign policy is based mainly but not exclusively on military power. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has opened hearings on the foreign aid bill, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee has completed its hearings. The Administration would spend the foreign military aid in Europe along several lines. The principal beneficiaries would be the individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moreover, the Administration is encouraging the five Western European powers which on July 24 agreed in principle to establish a supranational defense system, with a single defense commissioner, to pool their military resources—manpower, finances, supplies. The nations interested in forming such a system are France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg. At the same time General Dwight D. Eisenhower is going forward with his plan for developing a European army which would embrace not only those nations but all other Atlantic treaty states on the continent. Britain for the time being remains aloof despite General Eisenhower's urgings to London to participate in the European army.

The National Security Council in Washington is studying the report by the late

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, chief of naval operations, who died suddenly in Naples on July 21 after a fortnight of exhausting negotiations in London and Madrid. Admiral Sherman took up with the British the yet-unsettled problem of how the United States and Britain should divide their naval authority in the Atlantic and Mediterranean under the North Atlantic treaty. The Spanish talks laid the foundation for what President Truman calls a "new policy." Admiral Sherman proposed to General Francisco Franco that Spain give the United States the use of a number of Spanish air and naval bases; in return the United States would furnish military and economic aid to Spain. Spain is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, in view of the opposition of Britain and France, is not likely to become one.

### Aid to Franco

The proposed Spanish policy, which seems certain of execution, is political rather than military in its implications. The official emphasis on the military aspects of the arrangement makes the coming rapprochement with Spain more palatable to supporters of free institutions than a simple hand-out in the form of a new loan or a Marshall plan grant. The United States has an interest in improving the rapidly deteriorating economy of Spain to prevent that country from plunging into the chaos that leads to political crises.

From the point of view of the State Department, a more compelling reason for some agreement with Spain is the power of the pro-Franco bloc in Congress, where advocates of help to Spain might determine whether the pending foreign aid bill is to pass or be defeated. Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, scolded State Department officials in his office in the presence of Spanish Ambassador Jose Felix de Lequerica last spring for the failure of the Administration to

give more effective help to Spain under an Export-Import Bank credit approved in the fall of 1950. Spain is the ransom for McCarran's vote on the foreign aid bill. The Defense Department, for its part, is pleased with the new policy because it has been recommending for at least three years that the United States make a military arrangement with Spain as a source of strength for us in Europe and the Mediterranean. It is reported that while Franco has asked for an Export-Import Bank loan of \$1,275,000,000, he has not promised—earlier rumors to the contrary notwithstanding—to send troops abroad in case of Russian aggression.

### Congress Delays

Despite the alarms sounded by the Administration, the House Appropriations Committee is still dawdling over the military appropriations bill, which in other years has been approved before the end of June. A number of Senators have suggested that the \$8.6 billion for foreign aid be appropriated as a two-year program instead of for one year. Among these is Senator H. Alexander Smith, Republican of New Jersey, a staunch supporter of Administration policy in Europe since he entered Congress in 1944. Secretary of State Acheson discouraged many supporters of foreign aid by stating on July 26 that \$6.3 billion for military assistance not only was necessary for this year, but that a similar sum would be sought for two ensuing years. By inconsistency in its statements, the Administration is confusing those whom it means to persuade. "Keep the door open for negotiations [with the Soviet Union] and possible settlement on acceptable terms," the State Department said in a formal policy paper on trade controls in June. Yet the whole tenor of the Administration's current campaign of persuasion implies that negotiation is undesirable because it may erode our determination and make it difficult to maintain our military power.

BLAIR BOLLES

## Argentine Political Pattern Affects Latin America

The new pattern of revolution that President Juan D. Perón has followed in Argentina—appeal to, and cultivation of, the mass of the workers rather than the army and its political camp followers—has been reflected significantly in other Latin American countries.

In Bolivia, for example, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) resembles the Peronista party in Argentina. Indeed, its leader, Víctor Paz Estenssoro,

has spent much time in Argentina, and some observers believe he enjoys Perón's active favor. In any case, the MNR is a mass party, drawing most of its strength from the "shirtless" laborers in Bolivia's tin mines. Its main propaganda stock in trade is hatred of the "tin barons," Bolivian prototypes of Perón's "oligarchs." And in spite of Paz Estenssoro's gestures of friendship toward the United States, the grass-roots campaigning of the MNR features

attacks on "yanqui imperialism" as the alleged force behind the tin barons.

The MNR came within a hair's breadth of power in the May 6 presidential election. Paz Estenssoro, its candidate, won a clear and startling plurality, although he fell short of the absolute majority required by Bolivian law. Under such circumstances, Congress is supposed to choose a president from among the three leading candidates. Rather than take a chance that the legis-

lature might logically select Paz Estenssoro or that the MNR, emboldened by its success, might try to seize power without waiting for Congress, President Mamerto Uriolagoitia resigned on May 16 and a military junta took over the government. The *descamisados* of Bolivia have therefore been shut off. But the extreme measures their opponents used to block them reveal clearly their new strength in a country where politics has traditionally been a game of the small economic-military ruling class.

### Colombia's Disunity

In Colombia, currently one of the more troubled countries of Latin America, the influence of those who appeal to the masses is less obvious. Nevertheless, it weighs heavily in the nation's politics. The Liberal party governed Colombia uninterrupted from 1930 to 1946. As a party, it was something of a catchall; its membership extended from mildly liberal business and professional men on the right to radical labor agitators on the left—practically everyone, in fact, who was not committed to the old Conservative, landowning class.

This heterogeneity, and the growing influence of the masses, cost it power in 1946. There was a bitter row within the party between right and left wings. As a result, each ran its own candidate for president. Together, they would have polled a majority of the votes. But the Conservatives were stronger than either Liberal faction alone. For the first time in 20 years, a Conservative president was elected—Mariano Ospina Pérez, succeeded in 1950 by Laureano Gómez.

Defeat did not bring the quarreling Liberals together. The strength and character of the working-class left wing showed itself in the bloody riots that disrupted the 1948 Bogotá conference. The assassination of the leftist Liberal leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, touched off a mob uprising, encouraged by Communists, that made the potential and, in this case, irresponsible power of the masses frighteningly clear.

Since then the gulf between the Liberal left and right has steadily widened. This has made it easier for the Conservatives, completely unscrupulous in their methods, to cripple and almost destroy the opposition party. At the same time they pay

tribute to the validity of the leftists by trying to outbid them in promises of benefits to the masses. The workers of Colombia have never played any part in the Conservative party, and they were a subordinate factor among the Liberals. Everything indicates that from now on, whichever party is in power will have to give serious consideration to mass needs and demands.

### Communists in Guatemala

The most striking current example of mass strength in Latin America is in Guatemala. The former president, Juan José Arévalo, whose term expired in 1950, was a product of the revolution that ousted dictator Jorge Ubico. Calling himself a "spiritual socialist," Arévalo set up a government composed of liberals, Socialists and Communists. He distrusted the traditionally conservative army, so he worked deliberately, much as Perón had done, to build up a mass counterweight by organizing laborers and farm hands and by strengthening the unions. In this he was highly successful.

Arévalo, however, failed to discriminate between Communist and non-Communist mass leaders. The inevitable result was that the Communists bored into the government and the unions until, whether Arévalo liked it or not, they were calling his tune. Arévalo's successor as president, Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, definitely did not like this situation. But he was completely entangled in the Red network he inherited from Arévalo, and today he hesitates to cut the ties that bind him to Arévalo's spiritual socialism and to the promises he himself made to get elected. If he should try to do so, the Communist-led workers might take up arms against him.

Here, then, are three current examples of the increasing importance of the masses in Latin America. There are equally significant, if less spectacular, instances in other countries. Such a trend was long overdue. Illiteracy, disease and poverty of the masses have played an important part in holding back the development of the Latin American countries.

But the new trend also involves serious dangers, illustrated particularly in Argentina and Guatemala. The danger is that the wrong people may easily get control of this new social and political force. In

Argentina the masses have become simply a tool of the personal dictatorship of Perón. In Guatemala they are instruments of Communist leadership.

The United States can hardly fail to cooperate in any movement to improve the standards of living of the peoples of Latin America. Indeed, it is doing so through the Point Four program. The question of mass leadership is a harder one to handle. Washington's clumsy attempts to eliminate Perón at the beginning of his rise to power only made it easier for him to succeed. Any similar attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of any Latin American country would have the same result. The United States would seem to be doomed to a necessarily passive role, except in so far as it can indirectly encourage such constructive leadership between the extremes of right and left as may exist in the Latin American countries. Nor should Washington, as at times it has seemed to do, go out of its way to show favor to undesirable leaders simply because they are in power and profess opportunistic friendship for this country. Beyond that, it is up to the Latin Americans themselves.

HARRY B. MURKLAND

(The second of two articles. Mr. Murkland is Latin American editor of *Newsweek*.)

### BOOKS ON EASTERN EUROPE

*Tito's Communism*, by Josef Korbel. Denver, University of Denver Press, 1951. \$4.

A former Czechoslovak ambassador to Belgrade, who served there from 1945 to 1948 and is now professor of international relations at the University of Denver, believes that there is little difference between the totalitarianism of Tito and that of Stalin, and contends that the Tito-Stalin conflict, gratifying as it may be to Yugoslav nationalist sentiment, has so far brought no improvement in the lives of the Yugoslav people.

*The East European Revolution*, by Hugh Seton-Watson. New York, Praeger, 1951. \$5.50.

An excellent survey of developments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece in World War II and the post-war period. The author, who teaches modern history at Oxford University, is the son of the late Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, distinguished British authority of Eastern European affairs.

*Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, by Hubert Ripka. London, Gollancz, 1950. \$3.50.

The author, a leader of the Czech National Socialist party who served as minister of foreign trade in the first postwar Czech government, paints a grim detailed picture of the background and actual carrying out of the Communist coup in 1947, but predicts that the Czechs, who throughout their history have had to struggle for liberty against the encroachments of the great powers, will again achieve independence.

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